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Abstract 
Labor force participation rates of mothers in Austria and Germany are similar, however full-
time employment rates are much higher among Austrian mothers. In order to find out to what 
extent these differences can be attributed to differences in the tax transfer-system, we 
perform a comparative micro simulation exercise. After estimating structural labor supply 
models of both countries, we interchange two important institutional characteristics of the two 
countries, namely (i) the definition of the tax unit within the personal income tax and (ii) the 
parental leave benefit scheme. As our analysis shows, differences in mothers’ employment 
patterns can partly be explained by the different tax systems: While Germany has a system 
of joint taxation with income splitting for married couples, Austria taxes everyone individually, 
which leads to lower marginal tax rates for secondary earners than the German system. 
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1 Introduction 
There is considerable variation in the employment rates of mothers with young children 
across European countries. Traditionally, Scandinavian countries have relatively high em-
ployment rates of mothers, while in Southern European countries, but also Austria and Ger-
many, employment rates of mothers are relatively low (see OECD, 2002). These differences 
have often been explained by different work incentives created by the tax-transfer system and 
the child care infrastructure. However, these institutional factors do not only influence the 
participation decision but also working hours. Countries with similar participation rates of 
mothers can have quite different average working hours of employed mothers. Comparing 
employment behavior of mothers with young children in Austria and Germany we see that the 
share of mothers with children above age two who work is relatively similar in both countries. 
However, once Austrian mothers start working, they are twice as often working full-time as 
compared to Germans. We try to explain these differences by specific features of the tax-
transfer system in both countries.  
Comparing Austria and Germany is an interesting case because the two countries share many 
common institutions and can both be assigned to the corporatist welfare state regime (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Furthermore, also the child care institutions are very similar as far as avail-
ability, costs and quality are concerned. However, there are two important differences influ-
encing the work incentives for mothers with young children. First, income taxation differs 
with respect to the definition of the tax unit. While in Austria, all individuals, whether married 
or not, are taxed individually, Germany has a system of joint taxation with income splitting 
for married spouses. This feature of the tax system has a strong influence on marginal tax 
rates and thus creates very different work incentives for secondary earners. The second impor-
tant difference in the tax-transfer systems is the design of the parental leave benefit scheme. 
This scheme is much more generous in Austria than in Germany, in terms of the amount of 
the benefit, the maximum duration period as well as the income thresholds. 
To investigate to what extent differences in labor supply behavior can be traced back to these 
two features of the tax system we have to control for differences in preferences and other 
aspects of the tax-benefit system in these countries. We first show the structure of work incen-
tives induced by the tax-transfer system for stylized family types. Then we pursue a compara-
tive micro simulation exercise starting with the estimation of a behavioral model of maternal 
labor supply based on representative data-sets and detailed tax-transfer models for both coun-
tries. Thereafter we interchange the two distinctive features of the tax-transfer systems in 
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Austria and Germany, namely the definition of the tax unit as well as the parental leave bene-
fit. For Germany, we simulate the introduction of individual taxation as practiced in Austria. 
Separately, we simulate a switch to the Austrian parental leave scheme. Finally, we simulate 
both institutional characteristics at the same time to show the joint effect. The same exercise 
is done for implementing the German legislation in Austria. 
Our results show that interchanging these two features of the tax-benefit scheme would in fact 
increase German mothers’ participation rates and decrease participation in Austria. All in all, 
these two distinctive institutional characteristics explain part of the difference in full-time 
employment rates. The difference in part-time rates, however, would become even more pro-
nounced if both countries interchanged the definition of the tax unit and the parental leave 
benefit. Part-time employment would rise in Germany and fall in Austria. This can be ex-
plained by lower costs of child care for part-time slots in Germany as well as strong prefer-
ences for part-time work of mothers with young children. 
2 Differences and Similarities between Austria and Germany 
2.1 Employment behavior of mothers 
Table 1 shows that the share of mothers with children up to 10 years who are not participating 
in the labor market is higher in Austria than in Germany. About 50 percent of mothers with 
children in this age group are not working in Austria, while this share amounts to 43 percent 
in Germany. We find the same pattern for mothers whose youngest child is below three years. 
In this group, the non-participation rate is 77 percent in Austria and 66 percent in Germany. 
The majority of participating mothers in Germany are engaged in part-time work. Among all 
mothers with children up to 10 years, the part-time employment rate in Germany amounts to 
34 percent but only 22 percent in Austria. Even more striking are the differences in marginal 
employment (“geringfügige Beschäftigung”), which are almost three times as high in Ger-
many (10.4 percent) as in Austria (3.7 percent). In Austria, full-time employment is much 
more prevalent: 24 percent of all mothers are working full-time compared to 13 percent in 
Germany. This difference is even more pronounced if we look at the group of mothers whose 
youngest child is 3 to 10 years old: In this group, the share of full-time working mothers in 
Austria is 32 percent and only 15 percent in Germany. 
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Table 1: Employment patterns of mothers with young children in Austria and Germany 
 Mothers with youngest child aged 0-2 
Mothers with youngest 
child aged 3-10 All Mothers 
 Austria Germany Austria Germany Austria Germany 
Not working 77.2% 66.1% 33.8% 33.3% 50.0% 43.1% 
Marginally employed 2.5% 8.7% 4.3% 11.2% 3.7% 10.4% 
Part-time working 9.2% 17.2% 29.6% 40.8% 22.0% 33.7% 
Full-time working 11.1% 8.1% 32.3% 14.8% 24.3% 12.8% 
Sources: Austrian version of SILC 2004; SOEP 2004. 
 
Note that the aggregate numbers for Germany hide the prevailing strong differences in em-
ployment patterns between East and West Germany.1 A more detailed description of em-
ployment patterns, including separate shares for single mothers and mothers living in couples, 
can be found in the Appendix. 
                                                                         
2.2 Institutions2 
A. Income Taxation 
As far as income taxation is concerned, the most important difference between Austria and 
Germany is the fact that married spouses can file jointly and apply full income splitting in 
Germany, while in Austria all persons are taxed individually. Under the German system of 
joint taxation with income splitting (“Ehegattensplitting”) the income tax of a married couple 
is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of the spouses’ incomes. This 
amount is then doubled to determine the tax amount of the couple. This procedure guarantees 
that married couples – given a certain level of household income – will always be charged the 
same amount of income tax, no matter how income is distributed between husband and wife. 
Thus, the German system implies a “splitting advantage”, defined as the difference between 
the tax amount that a married couple pays under income splitting and the amount the same 
couple would pay in case of separate filing – or in case of individual taxation such as prac-
ticed in Austria. The amount of the “splitting advantage” depends on the income distribution 
between husband and wife and on the absolute level of household income.3  
 
1 Full-time employment rates of mothers whose youngest child is 3 to 10 years old amount to 35 percent in East 
and 12 percent in West Germany. See Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) for a detailed overview of mothers’ em-
ployment behavior in East and West Germany for the time period of 1991 to 2002. 
2 Since we use data from 2003 for the empirical analysis, we describe the institutional characteristics of both 
countries for the same year. 
3 See Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) for more details on the “splitting advantage” in Germany. 
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B. Family Allowance 
The most important cash transfer for families with dependent children is very similar in Ger-
many and Austria as far as the amount of the benefit as well as the entitlement regulation is 
concerned. In Austria, the family allowance (“Familienbeihilfe”) is a universal benefit 
amounting to between 1,260 and 2,100 Euro annually per child, depending on the age and 
rank order of the child. This benefit is supplemented by a refundable tax credit (“Kinder-
absetzbetrag”) that amounts to 610.8 Euro annually per child. The German family allowance 
(“Kindergeld”) amounts to 1,848 Euro per year independent of the age of the child. From the 
fourth child onwards, this child benefit rises to 2,148 Euro per year. In contrast to Austria, 
which grants a fully refundable child tax credit in addition to the family allowances, Germany 
applies a higher-yield test between the family allowance and the tax relief that results from a 
child tax allowance amounting to 2,904 Euro per year. Although at first sight, this seems to be 
an important difference towards the Austrian system, in fact, the child tax allowance leads 
only to higher income gains than the family allowance for taxable incomes above 63,000 Euro 
per year, which corresponds more or less to the 85th percentile of the distribution of taxable 
incomes (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2006). 
C. Parental Leave Benefit 
Parental leave benefit schemes differ quite substantially between Germany and Austria con-
cerning the amount, the duration period as well as the income thresholds up to which the 
benefit is granted. In Austria, parents can draw the parental leave benefit until the youngest 
child has reached the age of 30 months. If the benefit is drawn by both parents, the duration 
period is extended until the child is three years old. The benefit amounts to 5,303 Euro per 
year for the youngest child. In the case of multiple births, a supplement of 50 percent for 
every additional child is granted until the birth of a further child. The parental leave benefit is 
only granted if gross annual income of the parent who is receiving the benefit does not exceed 
14,600 Euro per year. Parents with very low income may apply for a supplementary payment, 
which is granted as a loan. 
In Germany, the maximum duration period of the parental leave benefit is 24 months after the 
birth of the youngest child. The annual benefit is only 70 percent of the Austrian benefit and 
amounts to 3,684 Euro. In contrast to Austria, where the benefit is only tested against the 
income of the parent who receives the transfer, the parental leave benefit in Germany is 
means-tested on the household level with two different income thresholds. In the first six 
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months after the child’s birth, the income thresholds up to which the benefit is paid are more 
generous (net household income must not exceed 51,130 Euro per year) than for the next 18 
months (below 16,470 Euro per year). If income exceeds the threshold in the first six months, 
no benefit is granted at all. In the following 18 months, the parental leave benefit is with-
drawn at a rate of 62.4 percent. The parental leave benefit is only granted if one of the parents 
is working less than 30 hours a week.4 
D. Child Care Institutions 
Austria and Germany furthermore have a very similar child care „market“ that is character-
ized by subsidized child care facilities of homogenous quality at relatively low parents’ fees, 
however only limited accessibility.5 Table 2 shows availability of child care slots as well as 
average fees of child care facilities in Austria and Germany.6 
In the previous literature on mothers’ labor supply (see, among others, Merkle (1994) for 
Germany and Mahringer (2005) for Austria), child care costs have often been measured as 
average parents’ fees to center-based child care. However, given the low availability of formal 
child care slots in both countries, in particular for children under three years, it cannot be 
assumed that child care costs equal the average parents’ fees charged by formal child care 
centers.7 An adequate measure of child care costs in both countries has to take into account 
that child care is possibly rationed. We will do so by assuming that child care costs can be 
modeled as a weighted average of the fees for a subsidized slot and the private costs of child 
care, yielding a measure of “expected costs of child care”. We present a detailed description 
of the calculation of these costs in Appendix 2. Table 3 summarizes the expected costs for 
part-time and full-time child care in both countries by different age groups. For children under 
three years as well as for children aged seven to ten years, child care costs are very similar in 
both countries. For children aged three to six, costs are lower in Germany, which is due to the 
fact that availability of subsidized child care is relatively high for children in this age group 
since a legal claim for a part-time slot has been introduced in 1996. 
                                                                          
4 Note that Germany introduced a new parental leave  benefit (“Elterngeld”) in 2007. This new benefit replaces 
the “Erziehungsgeld” and amounts to 67% of net earnings prior birth for the stay-at-home parent for the maximum 
duration of 1 year. If both parents share parental leave, the maximum duration can be extended by 2 more 
months. 
5 See Dörfler (2007) for a detailed comparison of child care institutions in Austria and Germany. 
6 Note that the Austrian figures refer to values from the city of Vienna only, whereas the numbers for Germany 
refer to the national average. As a consequence the parents’ fees for Austria as shown in Table 2 are considera-
bly higher than those for Germany. See Appendix 2 for a more detailed discussion.  
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Table 2: Costs and availability of formal child care in Austria and Germany 
 Children aged 0-2 Children aged 3-68 Children aged 7-10 
 Austria Germany Austria Germany Austria Germany 
Number of part-time child 
care slots per 100 children 3.4 0.8 19.3 57.1 26.9 8.9 
Number of full-time child 
care slots per 100 children 12.9 7.7 44.0 32.7 -- -- 
Average parents’ fee for a 
part-time slot, Euro/month 118 62 118 60 131 49 
Average parents’ fee for a 
full-time slot, Euro/month 199 127 199 96   
Sources: Statistik Austria, Kindertagesheimstatistik 2003/04; Stadt Wien, MA 11A; Statistisches Bundesamt 
2004; SOEP 2002. 
Note that data on availability of child care slots in Germany are available only every fourth year. Information on 
parents’ fees in the SOEP is only available in 2002. 
 
Table 3: “Expected costs of child care” 
 Children aged 0-2 Children aged 3-6 Children aged 7-10 
 Austria Germany Austria Germany Austria Germany 
Average expected child 
care costs for part-time 
care, Euro/month 
311 315 163 69 253 280 
Average expected child 
care costs for full-time care, 
Euro/month 
635 636 387 286 -- -- 
Sources: Own calculations based on Statistik Austria, Kindertagesheimstatistik 2003/04; Stadt Wien, MA 11A; 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2004; SOEP 2002, 2004. 
 
We assume that whether and how much child care is required for a child depends on the 
mothers’ and fathers’ working decisions and the age of the child. Thus, if at least one of the 
parents is not working, no external child care is necessary. If one parent is working part-time 
and the other full-time, children aged 0 to 6 years need part-time child care, whereas older 
children are assumed to be looked after in school. If both parents work full-time, children 
aged 0 to 6 need full-time care and children aged 7 to 10 need part-time care, since in Austria 
and Germany full-time care provided by schools is not common. 
                                                                          
7 See Dörfler (2004) and Wrohlich (2007a) for empirical evidence on excess demand for childcare in Austria and 
Germany, respectively. 
8 The number of slots per 100 children aged 3-6 for Austria is somewhat underestimated due to the age 
classification we use. This age group contains 4 cohorts: 3-year-old, 4-year-old, 5-year-old and 6-year-old. 
However, usually children attend “Kindergarten” for three years only. 
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2.3 Work Incentives in Austria and Germany 
The differences and similarities in the tax-transfer system, including the child care system, in 
Austria and Germany can best be summarized by comparing stylized budget constraints. The 
following figures show the relative change in net household income compared to income 
when the secondary earner, i.e. the mother, does not work at different levels of the mother’s 
working hours. We show these stylized budget constraints for two household types: A married 
couple with one child aged 1 year and a married couple with two children aged 4 and 7 years. 
It is assumed that the husband is working full-time at the median hourly wage of the male 
wage distribution (15 Euro in Germany, 13 Euro in Austria) and the mother earns the median 
wage of the female wage distribution (12 Euro in Germany, 10 Euro in Austria).  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the change in net household income ignoring costs of child care. 
The two tax-transfer systems generate several important differences. The income gain for both 
families is higher in Germany than in Austria for low levels of mothers’ working hours: In the 
case of the couple with a 1-year old child, net household income at a weekly working time of 
6 hours exceeds income at zero working hours by 15.6 percent in Germany but only 12.6 
percent in Austria. Working above this threshold, however, becomes very unattractive in 
Germany, in particular for the family with the 1-year old child. At 7 working hours, the moth-
ers’ earnings exceed the minimum income limit for marginal employment (“Geringfügig-
keitsgrenze”) and are thus due to social security contributions and income taxation. Moreover, 
the family loses eligibility of the parental leave benefit because household income exceeds the 
maximum income threshold. It is only from 17 hours onwards that the relative gain in net 
household income is higher than at 6 working hours. In Austria, the kink above 7 hours is 
negligibly small due to the fact that the minimum income limit for marginal employment in 
Austria only affects social security contributions, but not income taxation. Since each spouse 
is taxed individually in Austria, the increase in income by working hours of the mother is 
much steeper than in the German case. However, there is a large drop in the income gain at 29 
hours due to the withdrawal of the parental leave benefit. Thus, full-time work for mothers 
with children in this age group is relatively unattractive as compared to part-time work. 
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The budget line of a family with two children aged 4 and 7 years shows less kinks in both 
countries, since this household is not eligible to parental leave benefit any more. Comparing 
the budget lines for this family under the two country-specific regimes reveals the “pure” 
difference due to the tax system. Since low earnings are exempt from social security contribu-
tions and income taxation in Germany, the relative income gain at 6 hours of weekly work is 
slightly higher in Germany (15.5 percent) than in Austria (14.6 percent). From that threshold 
onwards, however, employment pays off much more in Austria than in Germany. For exam-
ple, part-time employment (20 hours) increases income by 39 percent in Austria but only 26.3 
percent in Germany as compared to the single-earner case. If the mother is working full-time 
net household income increases by 67.5 percent in Austria but only 50 percent in Germany. 
Figure 1: Relative change in household income as compared to non-participation 
of the mother; couple with one child (1 year old); without taking into 
account childcare costs 
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Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
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Figure 2: Relative change in household income as compared to non-participation 
of the mother; couple with two children (4 and 7 years old); without 
taking into account childcare costs 
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Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the relative change in household income for the same example 
households. However in contrast to Figure 1 and Figure 2, child care costs are deducted ac-
cording to age and number of children. We assume that if the mother is working 1-20 hours 
per week, part-time care has to be purchased for all children up to 6 years. If the mother is 
working more than 20 hours, full-time care has to be purchased for children in this age group 
as well as part-time care for children aged 7-10. If the mother is not working, we assume that 
the household does not have to pay for child care. 
Deducting child care costs in the way described above results in losses of household income 
as mothers start to work, because child care costs are high, in particular for families with 
children under three years. German mothers with a child in this age group can increase house-
hold income only by 0.4 percent if they work 6 hours per week. In Austria, household income 
is even 0.3 percent lower than in the single-earner (and no child care) case. Above the thresh-
old of 6 hours of weekly work, we find the same pattern that has already been illustrated in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2: The increase in household income is much steeper in Austria than in 
Germany. Part-time employment at 20 hours of weekly work increases household income by 
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21 percent in Austria but only by 5 percent in Germany. Full-time work is relatively unattrac-
tive in both countries, increasing net income only by 14 percent.  
The example of a married couple with two children aged 4 and 7 years illustrates very clearly 
the different incentive structures in both countries. 6 hours of weekly work lead to higher 
income gains in Germany (12.3 percent) than in Austria (6.7 percent). Full-time work, on the 
other hand, adds only little less to household income in Germany – 22.7 percent as compared 
to a single-earner family – whereas in Austria, income increases by 36.7 percent.  
Figure 3: Relative change in household income as compared to non-participation 
of the mother; couple with one child (1 year old); taking into account 
childcare costs 
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Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
We can sum up the findings of the preceding graphical illustration as follows: For married 
mothers with children under 2 years, marginal employment (at six hours of work) is slightly 
more attractive in Germany than in Austria. Part-time work at about 20 hours is more attrac-
tive in Austria than in Germany, however full-time employment  is not attractive for Austrian 
mothers and hardly attractive for German mothers when compared to part-time work. For 
married mothers with children aged three years to ten years, we also find that marginal em-
ployment is more attractive in Germany than in Austria, whereas full-time employment is far 
more attractive in Austria than in Germany. 
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Figure 4: Relative change in household income as compared to non-participation 
of the mother, couple with two children (4 and 7 years old); taking into 
account childcare costs 
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Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
Obviously, the differences in employment patterns of mothers with young children in Austria 
and Germany reflect the institutional characteristics of the two tax-transfer systems. The par-
ticipation rate of mothers with very young children is higher in Germany than in Austria, 
which is to a large extent driven by the high rate of part-time and marginal employment. 
Mothers with children above two years have a very similar participation rate, however, The 
full-time rate of mothers in Austria is almost twice as high as the rate in Germany. Yet, em-
ployment patterns are not only affected by institutional settings but also by the empirical dis-
tribution of wages as well as preferences. In the following empirical analysis we apply struc-
tural models for Austria and Germany to take these labor market characteristics into account. 
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3 Empirical Methodology and Data 
We estimate two labor supply models, each embedded in a detailed tax-benefit model of the 
Austrian and German legislation, respectively, in order to find out to what extent the differ-
ences in employment patterns of mothers with young children can be attributed to the differ-
ent tax systems and benefits. We will proceed as follows: First, structural parameters of a 
labor supply model are estimated separately for Germany and Austria on representative micro 
data sets for each country. We model labor supply in a discrete choice framework including 
the choice categories non-participation, part-time work and full-time work. For each category, 
net incomes are calculated using detailed tax-benefit models. In a further step, we perform 
different simulations of the tax-benefit system in both countries: For Germany, we simulate 
first the introduction of individual taxation as practiced in Austria, second, the Austrian type 
of the parental leave benefit and third both changes simultaneously. Similarly, we perform 
three simulations for Austria. Using the structural parameters from the labor supply estima-
tion, we then predict the labor market outcomes under the simulation scenarios. With this 
procedure, we can estimate the overall effect of the two most important institutional differ-
ences between Austria and Germany, but also – in an intermediate step – distinguish between 
the effect of the tax system and the parental leave benefit scheme. 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis for Germany is based on the 2004 wave of the Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) and for Austria we use the 2004 wave of the European Community Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Both datasets are representative samples of house-
holds living in Germany/Austria with detailed information on household income, working 
hours and household structure such as number and exact age of the children.9 
For both countries, we restrict the sample to families (married and cohabiting couples as well 
as single mothers) with at least one child aged 10 years or younger. Mothers who are self-
employed or in education are also excluded from our sample. Table A 2 in the Appendix 
shows descriptive statistics on the number of observations in both data-sets and some socio-
                                                                          
9 For more information on the SOEP see http://www.diw.de/soep and for the SILC for Austria see 
http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/eusilc_txt.shtml. 
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economic characteristics. The table illustrates that sample sizes get very small for sub-groups 
like single mothers. Therefore, we are not able to perform a separate analysis for this group. 
Net household income, which is a crucial variable in the estimation of labor supply, is calcu-
lated using tax-benefit simulation models that contain all important features of the German 
and Austrian tax-transfer system.10 On the basis of these tax-benefit models, it is possible to 
calculate net household incomes for different working hours categories that will be used for 
the estimation of labor supply. 
Table 7 shows average net household incomes for different hours categories for both data 
sets, before and after the deduction of child care costs. 
Table 4: Average annual household net-income before and after deduction of child care 
costs 
 Austria Germany 
 before after before After 
Mother is not working 26,950 26,950 33,293 33,293 
Mother is working part-time 34,031 32,680 42,224 41,184 
Mother is working full-time 37,759 33,563 41,319 37,184 
All mothers 31,398 30,030 38,353 37,318 
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
3.2 Labor Supply Estimation 
The labor supply estimation is based on a structural model of the mother’s utility.11 It is as-
sumed that the mother maximizes a utility function in the arguments leisure and disposable 
household income. Working hours are modeled as a categorical variable. This is done for 
several reasons. First, it takes into account the fact that hours of work are heavily concen-
trated at particular hours. Second, the specification of a relatively small number of working 
hours categories leads to a tremendous reduction in computational burden of calculating net 
household income at each possible hours choice. Given the complexities of the tax-transfer 
system in both countries, this simplification is in fact a prerequisite for an adequate specifica-
tion of the budget constraint. We assume a choice set that consists of three working hours 
categories: non-participation, part-time work and full-time work (see Table 1 for the distribu-
                                                                          
10 We use the tax-benefit model STSM (Steiner et al., 2005) for Germany and ITABENA (Dearing and Lietz, 
2007) for Austria. 
11 This model is a special case of van Soest’s (1995) model with joint estimation of couples’ working hours. In our 
model hours of the husband are fixed. This can be justified by empirical findings of relatively inelastic labor supply 
elasticities of man as shown by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) or Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) for Germany. 
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tion of households across these choice categories). Note that the part-time category includes 
marginal employment. 
The econometric model is based on the assumption that a mother compares the expected util-
ity obtained from net income and her leisure associated with the choice of a particular hours 
category.12 It is assumed that the mother’s utility index for a particular hours category k can 
be modeled by the following quadratic function: 
 ( )k k k k k kU x x Ax xβ ε′ ′= + +   where ( , )x y l ′= .    (3) 
The components of x are net household income (y) and the mother’s leisure (l). These compo-
nents enter the utility function in linear, quadratic and cross terms. Matrix A contains the 
coefficients of the quadratic and the cross terms, the vector β contains the coefficients of the 
linear terms. εk is a stochastic error term accounting for unobserved factors that affect the 
mother’s utility. The mother will choose hours category k if, in probability terms, the associ-
ated utility index Uk exceeds the utility index in any other possible alternative l, i.e.: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )k l k k k l l l l kP U U P x Ax x x Ax xβ β ε ε⎡ ⎤′ ′′ ′> = + − + > −⎣ ⎦ .  (4) 
Assuming that εk is distributed identically across all hours categories according to an extreme-
value distribution, the difference of the utility index between any two hours categories follows 
a logistic distribution13. Under this distributional assumption the probability of choosing al-
ternative k relative to alternative l can be described by a Conditional Logit Model as intro-
duced by McFadden (1973): 
 
exp( )
( ) ,   
exp( )
k k k
k l
m m m
m
x Ax x
P U U l k
x Ax x
β
β
′ ′+> = ∀ ≠′ ′+∑ ,
                                                                         
    (5) 
where the summation sign is defined over all possible alternatives, i.e. hours categories. We 
control for observed heterogeneity by accounting for mother’s characteristics such as age, 
nationality, educational characteristics as well as the number of children by different age 
 
12 We assume the maximum time budget that can be allocated to market work and leisure, to be 80 hours per 
week. Note that leisure includes all sorts of non-market activities. 
13 The assumption that the error terms follows an extreme value distribution is rather restrictive and results in the 
property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Haan (2006) has shown for the case of women’s 
labor supply estimated on the SOEP data base that labor supply elasticities resulting from a conditional logit 
model as outlined above are not significantly different from elasticities derived from the estimation of a random 
coefficient model that is not based on the IIA assumption. 
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groups. For Germany, we furthermore interact income and leisure with a dummy variable 
indicating that the household is living in East Germany. 
Results of the labor supply estimation for Austria and Germany are reported in Table A 3 in 
Appendix 1. The coefficients, which can be interpreted as parameters of the utility function, 
lead to plausible results as far as the theoretical predictions are concerned. First derivatives of 
the utility function with respect to income and leisure are positive for almost all households in 
both countries. The second derivative of the utility function with respect to income is equal to 
0 in Germany and small and negative in Austria. The second derivative with respect to leisure 
is negative in Germany and very small (though positive) in Austria. 
Table 5: Changes in participation rates caused by a 1%-increase in gross hourly wage 
 Austria Germany 
 change in participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers 0.155 (0.140 – 0.171) 
0.189 
(0.145 – 0.232) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 0-2 
0.106 
(0.067 – 0.145) 
0.189 
(0.142 – 0.237) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 3-10 
0.185 
(0.181 – 0.189) 
0.188 
(0.144 – 0.232) 
 change in part-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers 0.058 (0.052 – 0.063) 
0.083 
(0.064 – 0.103) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 0-2 
0.100 
(0.086 – 0.113) 
0.130 
(0.097 – 0.165) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 3-10 
0.032 
(0.027 – 0.038) 
0.063 
(0.043 – 0.083) 
 Change in full-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers 0.098 (0.081 – 0.115) 
0.105 
(0.075 – 0.135) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 0-2 
0.006 
(-0.041 – 0.053) 
0.058 
(0.033 – 0.083) 
Mothers with youngest 
child 3-10 
0.153 
(0.148 – 0.157) 
0.125 
(0.090 – 0.161) 
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
Notes: Elasticities refer to a 1% increase in gross wage. Numbers in parentheses refer to 95%-confidence 
intervals derived using the bootstrap-method (100 repetitions). 
 
On the basis of estimated parameters we calculate labor supply elasticities that result from a 
1%-increase in the gross hourly wage (Table 5). Point estimates of the changes in participa-
tion rates are higher in Germany than in Austria, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Noticeably, the change in the participation rate is lower in Austria for mothers 
with small children than for mothers in general, while the elasticities are equal among both 
groups in Germany. A comparison of changes in part-time and full-time participation rates, 
however, reveals that the low elasticity for Austrian mothers stems from the very low change 
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in full-time participation that is not significantly different from 0. This can be explained by 
the incentive structure implied by the Austrian parental leave legislation. As we have shown 
in Figure 3, full-time employment leads to less income in absolute terms than part-time em-
ployment due to the withdrawal of the parental leave benefit.  
3.3 Policy Simulations 
As we have pointed out in section 2, the most important institutional differences between 
Austria and Germany that affect work incentives of mothers with young children are (i) the 
definition of the tax unit in the case of married couples and (ii) the parental leave benefit 
scheme. In order to find out whether and how much these structural differences can contribute 
to explain the different employment patterns of mothers, we perform several simulation exer-
cises. For both countries, we simulate three scenarios: one in which the tax system (joint ver-
sus individual taxation) is replaced by the tax system of the other country (A1 and G1), leav-
ing all other institutions equal, one in which we replace the parental leave benefit regulations 
with those of the other country (A2 and G2), and finally one in which we replace both the 
definition of the tax unit as well as the parental leave benefit with that of the other country 
(A3 and G3). Note that in simulations A1 and G1 (as well as A3 and G3), where we simulate 
joint taxation with income splitting for married spouses in Austria and individual taxation in 
Germany, we leave the tax schedule and the definition of taxable income as it is in both coun-
tries. However, in reforms G1 and G3 we take into account the single earner tax credit, which 
is abolished in reforms A1 and A3.14 
Table 6 shows the simulation results for disposable income. In Austria the introduction of 
joint taxation with income splitting (simulation A1) – though increasing disposable income in 
all categories – decreases the financial gain of changing from non participation to working 
part-time (22.2 percent versus 16.8 percent) as well as the gain of changing from part-time 
full-time work (3.6 percent versus 2.3 percent). This is true for mothers with young as well as 
for mothers with older children. In Germany, the shift to individual taxation (G1) increases 
work incentives, in particular for part-time work.  
                                                                          
14 In simulations A2 and G2 (as well as A3 and G3) benefits and income thresholds were taken from the respec-
tive country and were not adapted to different income levels. 
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Table 6: Simulation results: Average annual income in base and reform scenarios 
 Policy Simulations for Austria 
 Base A1: Joint taxation with income splitting 
A2: German parental 
leave benefit A3: Both 
 
 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase 
% 
All Mothers 
Non participation 25,849   27,556   24,999   26,711   
Part-time work 31,581 22.2% 32,176 16.8% 30,445 21.8% 31,041 16.2% 
Full-time work 32,717 3.6% 32,903 2.3% 32,098 5.4% 32,284 4.0% 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 
Non participation 26,161   27,708   23,885   25,445   
Part-time work 29,833 14.0% 30,375 9.6% 26,791 12.2% 27,336 7.4% 
Full-time work 28,196 -5.5% 28,371 -6.6% 26,540 -0.9% 26,715 -2.3% 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 
Non participation 25,663   27,466   --   27,466   
Part-time work 32,624 27.1% 33,251 21.1% -- -- 33,251 21.1% 
Full-time work 35,412 8.5% 35,604 7.1% -- -- 35,604 7.1% 
 Policy Simulations for Germany 
 Base G1: Individual taxation G2: Austrian parental leave benefit G3: Both 
 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase 
% 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
Average 
income 
Euro 
Increase % 
All Mothers 
Non participation 33,487   30,388   34,349   31,249   
Part-time work 38,100 13.78% 36,980 21.69% 38,846 13.09% 37,725 20.72% 
Full-time work 38,819 1.89% 38,179 3.24% 39,196 0.90% 38,556 2.20% 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 
Non participation 32,198   29,343   35,073   32,218   
Part-time work 34,240 6.34% 33,279 13.41% 36,724 4.71% 35,762 11.00% 
Full-time work 33,348 -2.61% 32,745 -1.60% 34,606 -5.77% 34,003 -4.92% 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 
Non participation 34,040   30,835   --   30,835   
Part-time work 39,755 16.79% 38,565 25.07% -- -- 38,565 25.07% 
Full-time work 41,162 3.54% 40,506 5.03% -- -- 40,506 5.03% 
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
The swap of parental leave benefits (A2 and G2) per definition affects only the group of 
mothers where the youngest child is less than three years old. In Austria disposable income 
decreases considerably due to the fact that the German parental leave benefit is less generous. 
Since the German income limit for couples is based on both partners’ income and therewith 
much stricter than the Austrian limit, taking up part-time work is more often combined with a 
loss of the parental leave benefit, although this loss is lower in absolute terms due to the lower 
amount of the German benefit. As a result, taking up part-time work becomes less attractive 
for Austrian mothers in the “A2” scenario. However, the income loss when changing from 
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part-time to full-time work becomes less pronounced in the case that Austria would introduce 
the German parental leave benefit. This is due to the fact that above the income threshold the 
Austrian benefit is fully withdrawn at once (see Figure 1). Thus, full-time work becomes 
more attractive for Austrian mothers in the case that they are exposed to the German parental 
leave benefit regulations. 
For the case that Germany would introduce the Austrian parental leave benefit (simulation G 
2) we find that both part-time and full-time employment become less attractive, at least on 
average. This can be explained by the large share of German mothers with children up to two 
years (46%) who are not receiving the parental leave benefit even though they are not partici-
pating in the labor market. In these cases, earnings of the husband already exceed the income 
threshold, which is defined at the household level. For these mothers, the switch to the Aus-
trian parental leave scheme makes non-participation far more attractive, because the Austrian 
benefit is means-tested at the individual rather than on the household level. 
The joint effect of interchanging the income tax system and the parental leave benefit is 
shown in the last column of Table 6 (simulations A3 and G3). For Austrian mothers with very 
young children part-time employment becomes much less attractive under the German regula-
tions, whereas full-time work becomes more attractive. For mothers with children between 
three and ten years, both working categories become less attractive. In the case that Germany 
introduced the Austrian tax system and parental leave regulations, we find that work incen-
tives increase for mothers of children older than three years. For mothers with younger chil-
dren, incentives to take up a full-time job decrease. Note that with the data at hand, it is not 
possible to model the change in the “marginal employment” category. From what we have 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, we would expect this category to become more attractive for Aus-
trian mothers if German institutions were introduced. 
Table 7 shows the labor supply effects that result from the change in disposable incomes due 
to the policy simulations. As expected, Austrian mothers would reduce their labor force par-
ticipation rate in the case of joint taxation (simulation A1). The participation rate of mothers 
would decrease by 2.4 percentage points, where about 1 percentage point is due to changes in 
part-time participation and 1.4 to changes in full-time participation. If Germany, on the other 
hand, introduced Austria’s system of individual taxation, mothers would increase labor force 
participation by more than 6 percentage points. The majority of women starting to participate 
would choose part-time: The part-time employment rate would increase by 4.5 percentage 
points, whereas the full-time employment rate would increase by only 1.7 percentage points. 
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Table 7: Simulation Results: Labor Supply Effects 
 Austria 
 A1: income splitting A2: German parental 
leave benefit 
A3: both 
 change in labor force participation rate  (in percentage points) 
All mothers -2.39 
(-2.26 – -2.52) 
-0.21 
(-0.31 – -0.10) 
-2.61 
(-2.76 – -2.46) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 -1.75 
(-1.95 – -1.56) 
-0.55 
(-0.84 – -0.26) 
-2.34 
(-2.59 – -2.08) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 -2.77 
(-2.92 – -2.63) 
-- -2.77 
(-2.93 – -2.62) 
 change in part-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers -1.02 
(-1.09 – -0.95) 
-0.44 
(-0.51 – -0.37) 
-1.43 
(-1.54 – -1.32) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 -1.21 
(-1.33 – -1.09) 
-1.17 
(-1.37 – -0.98) 
-2.32 
(-2.52 – -2.11) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 -0.90 
(-0.98 – -0.82) 
-- -0.90 
(-0.98 – -0.82) 
 change in full-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers -1.37 
(-1.47 – -1.28) 
0.23 
(0.13 – 0.34) 
-1.18 
(-1.31 – -1.05) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 -0.54 
(-0.62 – -0.47) 
0.62 
(0.38 – 0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.24 – 0.20) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 -1.87 
(-2.00 – -1.75) 
-- -1.87 
(-1.97 – -1.77) 
 Germany 
 G1: individual taxation G2: Austrian parental 
leave benefit 
G3: both 
 Change in labor force participation rate  (in percentage points) 
All mothers 6.15 
(4.83 – 7.48) 
-0.62 
(-0.88 – -0.36) 
5.52 
(4.30 – 6.74) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 6.15 
(4.74 – 7.64) 
-2.06 
(-2.91 – -1.22) 
4.08 
(2.86 – 5.30) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 6.15 
(4.76 – 7.51) 
-- 6.14 
(4.76 – 7.51) 
 change in part-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers 4.47 
(3.42 – 5.52) 
-0.38 
(-0.60 – -0.17) 
4.12 
(3.12 – 5.12) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 5.37 
(4.10 – 6.65) 
-1.28 
(-1.99 – -0.57) 
4.22 
(2.99 – 5.44) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 4.08 
(3.03 – 5.13) 
-- 4.08 
(3.03 – 5.13) 
 change in full-time participation rates (in percentage points) 
All mothers 1.68 
(1.30 – 2.07) 
-0.24 
(-0.32 – -0.15) 
1.40 
(1.06 – 1.74) 
Mothers with youngest child 0-2 0.82 
(0.52 – 1.11) 
-0.78 
(-1.06 – -0.51) 
-0.14 
(-0.29 – 0.02) 
Mothers with youngest child 3-10 2.06 
(1.59 – 2.52) 
-- 2.06 
(1.59 – 2.52) 
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to 95%-confidence intervals derived using the bootstrap-method (100 
repetitions). 
 
If Germany and Austria kept their tax systems but introduced the other country’s parental 
leave benefit scheme (simulations A2 and G2), we find the interesting result that labor force 
participation of mothers would decrease in both scenarios. For Germany, this is what we ex-
pected due to the change in work incentives as summarized in Table 6. Both part-time and 
full-time employments become less attractive under this simulation. In the Austrian case, full-
time employment becomes much more attractive if Austria were to shift to the German paren-
tal leave scheme, whereas part-time employment would become less attractive. Accordingly, 
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we find a decrease in part-time participation rates of 1.2 percentage points and an increase of 
the full-time employment rate amounting to 0.6 percentage points. The effect on full-time 
employment is relatively small, however, and does not compensate the drop in part-time em-
ployment. Thus, the overall effect on participation is negative. 
Simulations A3 and G3 show the combined effects of exchanging the definition of the tax unit 
and the parental leave benefit at the same time. As can be seen from Table 7 , this joint effect 
approximately equals the sum of simulations A1 and A2 and G1 and G2, respectively.15 As 
the effect of income splitting is quantitatively the more important, the combined effects are 
close to simulations A1 and G1.  
The “exchange” of the income tax systems between the two countries, i.e. the introduction of 
individual taxation in Germany and the switch to joint taxation with full income splitting in 
Austria would not only affect labor supply, but also the fiscal budget. For Germany, Bach et 
al. (2003) have shown that the abolishment of joint taxation with income splitting would lead 
to an increase of income tax revenues by about 22 billion Euro per year, which is about 10 
percent of total income tax revenues in Germany. Accordingly, Austria would face a loss in 
income tax revenues if it introduced the German system of taxing married couples. For a 
comprehensive assessment of the economic effects of these reforms, the fiscal effects would 
need to be considered. One simple way to model revenue-neutral reforms would be to intro-
duce lump-sum taxes or transfers in order to redistribute additional revenues or to collect the 
loss in income tax revenues from households. This, however, hardly affects the individual’s 
reactions with respect to labor supply that are the focus of our study, due to the fact that the 
substition effect dominates the relatively small income effect (see Wrohlich 2007b). 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
Employment patterns of mothers with young children differ considerably across European 
countries. These differences have often been attributed to institutional characteristics, in par-
ticular the work incentives created by the tax-transfer system as well as child care institutions. 
In this paper, we compare two countries, Germany and Austria that can both be defined as 
corporatist welfare states. Moreover, the general support for families through family allow-
ances as well as costs and availability of child care are very similar in both countries. Still, we 
find strong differences in the employment behavior of mothers, in particular for mothers with 
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children aged three to ten years: While participation rates are similar in both countries, full-
time employment rates are much higher in Austria than in Germany. The large majority of 
working mothers in Germany is engaged in marginal and part-time employment. 
A closer look at institutional differences between the two countries shows that the differences 
in employment patterns can well be explained by the different work incentive structure im-
plied by the tax-transfer systems. Two characteristics of the tax-transfer system affect moth-
ers’ employment decisions in a significant way. The definition of the tax unit for the personal 
income tax determines the marginal tax rate for secondary earners and is thus a crucial pa-
rameter affecting the work incentive structure. For mothers with very young children, the 
regulations concerning the parental leave benefit, such as the amount, maximum duration 
period as well as income threshold and withdrawal rates, are important as well. Austria and 
Germany have very different regulations as far as these two institutional characteristics are 
concerned. While in Germany, married spouses are taxed jointly and are eligible to full in-
come splitting, Austria has a system of individual taxation. On the other hand, Austria has a 
much more generous parental leave benefit scheme than Germany. The Austrian benefit is 
higher and granted for a longer period. Moreover, the income threshold is defined at the indi-
vidual level in Austria whereas the benefit is tested against household income in Germany. 
We use a structural labor supply model based on tax-transfer models for Austria and Germany 
to test whether these two characteristics of the tax-transfer system can explain labor supply 
differences in these countries. Our results show that the labor force participation of German 
mothers would rise considerably if Germany introduced Austria’s income tax and parental 
leave benefit institutions. In Austria, a small share of mothers would withdraw from the labor 
market if they were exposed to the German institutional environment. Since the labor force 
participation rate of mothers is very similar under the status quo in both countries, it can be 
concluded that German mothers seem to have stronger preferences towards participating in 
the labor market, given the lower work incentives induced by the German system. Most of the 
German mothers, however, who would choose to take up a job if they were exposed to the 
Austrian institutions, would prefer to work part-time. If the two countries exchanged their 
institutions, the difference in the full-time participation rate of mothers would decrease only 
by roughly 25 percent. 
                                                                          
15 This is not necessarily the case considering the highly non-linear character of the simulations. 
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Based on our empirical results we therefore conclude that part of the differences in employ-
ment patterns can in fact be explained by the different work incentives created by the tax-
benefit system. However, there is a remaining part of the differences that cannot be explained 
by merely changing particular institutional characteristics. The empirical distribution of 
wages, as well as child care costs and not least preferences for part-time and full-time work in 
the presence of young children also play an important role. 
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 Appendix 1: Tables 
Table A 1: Employment patterns of mothers with young children 
 Mothers with youngest 
child aged 0-2 
Mothers with youngest 
child aged 3-10 
All Mothers 
 Austria Germany Austria Germany Austria Germany 
Non-Singles       
Not working 77.4% 64.5% 36.6% 31.6% 52.1% 41.9% 
Part-time working 12.2% 27.3% 35.2% 52.3% 26.5% 44.9% 
Full-time working 10.4% 8.2% 28.2% 15.5% 21.4% 13.2% 
Singles       
Not working 75.7% 80.0% 17.1% 34.0% 36.3% 42.1% 
Part-time working 8.1% 10.0% 26.3% 43.9% 20.4% 38.1% 
Full-time working 16.2% 10.0% 56.6% 22.0% 43.4% 19.9% 
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
 
Table A 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Austria Germany 
 Absolute Share in % Absolute Share in % 
Number of households 846 100 1614 100 
Couples 733 87 1443 90 
Singles 113 13 171 10 
Youngest child aged 0-2 316 37 484 30 
Youngest child aged 3-6 265 31 607 38 
Youngest child aged 7-10 265 31 523 32 
     
 Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. 
Age of the father (if present) 37.3 7.2 38.6 6.3 
Age of the mother 34.0 6.3 35.8 5.8 
Number of children up to 10 1.5 0.6 1.5 0.6 
Mother is of German/Austrian 
nationality 0.88 -- 0.87 -- 
Mother holds high school degree 0.27 -- 0.29 -- 
     
Sources: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004; STSM based on SOEP 2004. 
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 Table A 3: Estimation results conditional logit model, Austria and Germany 
Variable Austria Germany 
net income 0.1047 (0.033) 0.0012 (0.000) 
leisure -0.0802 (0.030) 0.0162 (0.023) 
net income squared -0.0001 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000) 
leisure squared 0.0007 (0.000) -0.0011 (0.000) 
leisure * no. of children aged 0 to 2 0.0396 (0.006) -0.0335 (0.005) 
leisure * no. of children aged 0 to 10 0.0204 (0.005) -0.0085 (0.004) 
leisure * single -0.0297 (0.008) -0.0007 (0.007) 
leisure * education (high-school) -0.0149 (0.006) -0.0051 (0.006) 
leisure * mother holds German nationality - -0.0096 (0.007) 
leisure * family is living in east Germ. - -0.0040 (0.009) 
net income * family is living in east Germ. - -0.0006 (0.000) 
Number of observations 2538 4842 
Log Likelihood -764.4 -1443.9 
LR chi2 (8) 330.0 658.6 
Source: ITABENA based on Austrian version of SILC 2004 Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
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 Appendix 2: Calculating “expected costs of child care” 
An adequate measure of child care costs used in the estimation of mothers’ labor supply has 
to take into account that center-based child care (which is subsidized in almost 100% of the 
cases in Austria and Germany) is potentially rationed. Thus, we argue that it cannot be as-
sumed that all families could purchase child care at the average parents’ fee for subsidized 
child care. Rather, we need to use a measure that takes the excess demand for child care ex-
plicitly into account. This can be done by defining child care costs as a weighted average of 
the subsidized fee and private costs of child care. Formally this can be stated as follows: 
)1()( ftpt
ns
ptftpt
s
ptpt ppcppcec −−⋅++⋅=     (1) 
Expected costs of part-time child care (ecpt) consist of the parents' fee for a subsidized child 
care slot (cspt) and a market (non-subsidized) price for child care charged by a child minder 
(cnspt), weighted by the probability to get a subsidized part-time (ppt) or full-time (pft) child 
care slot. This probability takes into account that full-time slots are available for parents re-
questing a part-time slot at the costs of a part-time slot. For full-time child care (ecft) parents 
face three possibilities: either they get a subsidized full-time slot at costs csft; or they get a 
part-time slot at costs cnspt and have to use non subsidized child care at costs cnspt for the other 
half of the day; or no subsidized child care is available and they have to demand a full-time 
private child care slot at costs cfspt. These three options are weighted with their probability in 
equation (2).16  
)1()( ftpt
ns
ftpt
ns
pt
s
ptft
s
ftft ppcpccpcec −−⋅+⋅++⋅=    (2) 
The probability of getting a child care slot is the ratio of “actual” supply and demand, where 
supply is defined as number of slots in institutional child care facilities.17 In order to ap-
proximate the demand for child care we take the total number of children in the respective age 
group times a factor that takes into account that not all parents claim non-domestic child care 
for their children. 
The monthly parents’ fee for child care in a subsidized facility (cspt and csft in equations 1 and 
2) for Germany is calculated on the basis of individual information from the SOEP wave 
2002, when parents were asked their monthly child care expenses. For the Austrian case, we 
                                                                          
16 For further discussion of this approach see Wrohlich 2006. 
17 For Austria this number is taken from Statistik Austria (Kindertagesheimstatistik 2003/04), for Germany, see 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2004). 
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 make use of information on the parents fee structure charged by child care centers in Vienna. 
We take into account that parents’ fees are income dependent. Therefore we apply the follow-
ing social discounts for Austria (Source: Stadt Wien, MA 11A): For income below 828 Euro 
monthly no fee has to be paid, for income above 2,198 Euro monthly the full fee has to be 
paid, for income between these two amounts a tapered fee is applied. 
It would be more precise to collect prices for each federal state, however this is difficult, since 
each federal state has different legislations including different guidelines for prices. More-
over, within each federal state, prices differ considerably since child care institutions are in 
charge of municipalities, which also do not set prices uniformly. As in Vienna prices and 
availability for child care are higher than in other federal states the bias of taking Viennese 
settings for public child care slots cancels out somewhat, as higher prices increase expected 
costs while higher availability decreases them. 
As far as the price for private child care (cppt and cpft in equations 1 and 2) is concerned, we 
assume an average of 5 Euro per hour in Austria and Germany. While in Germany prices of 
day care mothers are used as a yardstick (see www.tagesmutter.de), in Austria this would not 
be appropriate. Austrian day mothers get around 2 Euro per hour (see 
http://www.efk.at/main/m_tagesmutter_3.htm), which is only slightly above hourly costs of 
public child care slots, but day mother slots are not always readily available either. However, 
even if Austrian private child care by day mothers is limited, there is no restriction in getting 
child care by “Leihomas” or child minders. “Leihomas” cost 6 Euro per hour (see Omadienst, 
katholischer Familienverband der Erzdiözese Wien), whereas child minder prices vary be-
tween 3 and 7 Euro per hour (see www.kinderbetreuung.at). 
Finally, we need to calculate the probability that children have access to subsidized part-time 
and full-time child care, ppt and pft. This could be done by assuming this probability to equal 
the local availability rate of part-time and full-time slots. However, this approach implies the 
assumption that all parents demand subsidized child care for all children, which is probably 
not plausible. Thus, we multiply the availability rate by a factor that take into account that not 
all parents claim non-domestic child care for their children. This factor is calculated as the 
share of children for which any sort of non-parental child care is used, including care by 
grandmothers and other free of charge child care. 
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